Merge the two ssl_context_load OOB length tests

Fold ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_cid_length and
ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_alpn_length into a single parameterized
test function, since they shared most of their code.

Signed-off-by: Naveed <naveed@bugqore.com>
This commit is contained in:
Naveed 2026-07-09 13:17:05 +05:30
parent 5ece3de4d2
commit 63f1c42b7c
2 changed files with 76 additions and 106 deletions

View File

@ -3065,12 +3065,12 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_ALPN_NO_NUL
SSL context serialization rejects out-of-bounds DTLS CID length
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_RSA_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY:TEST_GCM_OR_CHACHAPOLY_ENABLED
ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_cid_length:
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_length:TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_CID
SSL context serialization rejects out-of-bounds ALPN length
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_RSA_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY:TEST_GCM_OR_CHACHAPOLY_ENABLED
ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_alpn_length:
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_length:TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_ALPN
TLS 1.2: Session serialization rejects out-of-bounds session ID length (client)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C

View File

@ -32,6 +32,10 @@
#define TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_ALPN_NO_NUL 2
#define TEST_TLS12_SESSION_LOAD_OOB_ID_LEN 3
/* Corrupted length fields for ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_length */
#define TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_CID 0
#define TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_ALPN 1
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
@ -3038,9 +3042,10 @@ exit:
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_RSA_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY:TEST_GCM_OR_CHACHAPOLY_ENABLED */
void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_cid_length(void)
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_RSA_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY:TEST_GCM_OR_CHACHAPOLY_ENABLED */
void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_length(int field)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* Sentinel CID so we can find its location inside the serialized buffer. */
const unsigned char server_cid[] = {
0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A
@ -3048,100 +3053,23 @@ void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_cid_length(void)
const unsigned char client_cid[] = {
0x9A, 0x78, 0x56, 0x34, 0x12, 0xEF, 0xCD, 0xAB
};
mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options options;
mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep;
unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
size_t context_buf_len, i;
unsigned char *cid_len_p = NULL;
memset(&client_ep, 0, sizeof(client_ep));
memset(&server_ep, 0, sizeof(server_ep));
MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&options);
options.dtls = 1;
options.expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(
&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &options), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(
&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &options), 0);
/* Configure CID with unique patterns so we can locate the length byte in
* the serialized context. Both peers must agree on the CID length via
* conf_cid() before set_cid() will accept the value. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(&client_ep.conf, sizeof(client_cid),
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(&server_ep.conf, sizeof(server_cid),
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(&client_ep.ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED,
client_cid, sizeof(client_cid)), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(&server_ep.ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED,
server_cid, sizeof(server_cid)), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_dtls_join_endpoints(&client_ep, &server_ep), 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_connection(&options, &client_ep,
&server_ep));
/* Serialize the post-handshake server context. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_context_save(&server_ep.ssl, NULL, 0,
&context_buf_len),
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
TEST_CALLOC(context_buf, context_buf_len);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_context_save(&server_ep.ssl, context_buf,
context_buf_len, &context_buf_len), 0);
/* The serialized format writes [in_cid_len][in_cid bytes]; locate the
* length byte by searching for our sentinel CID. */
for (i = 1; i + sizeof(server_cid) <= context_buf_len; i++) {
if (context_buf[i - 1] == (unsigned char) sizeof(server_cid) &&
memcmp(context_buf + i, server_cid, sizeof(server_cid)) == 0) {
cid_len_p = context_buf + i - 1;
break;
}
}
TEST_ASSERT(cid_len_p != NULL);
/* Corrupt the length to the smallest value strictly greater than
* sizeof(in_cid), so we exercise the new bounds check rather than the
* pre-existing buffer-size check that would also trip on huge values. */
*cid_len_p = (unsigned char) (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + 1);
/* Reinitialise the server SSL context so we can load into a fresh one. */
mbedtls_ssl_free(&server_ep.ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_init(&server_ep.ssl);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&server_ep.ssl, &server_ep.conf), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_context_load(&server_ep.ssl, context_buf,
context_buf_len),
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
exit:
mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep);
mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep);
mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&options);
mbedtls_free(context_buf);
MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE();
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_RSA_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_CAN_HANDLE_RSA_TEST_KEY:TEST_GCM_OR_CHACHAPOLY_ENABLED */
void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_alpn_length(void)
{
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
/* The negotiated protocol (alpn[0]) is serialized; alpn[1] is longer and is
* what the corrupted length will match against on load, so the unbounded
* memcmp() reads past the end of the buffer. */
const char negotiated[] = "alpnsentinel";
const char *alpn[] = { negotiated, "alpnsentinel-padding", NULL };
#endif
mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options options;
mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep;
unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
size_t context_buf_len, i;
unsigned char *alpn_len_p = NULL;
const unsigned char *sentinel = NULL;
size_t sentinel_len = 0;
unsigned char corrupt_len = 0;
unsigned char *len_p = NULL;
memset(&client_ep, 0, sizeof(client_ep));
memset(&server_ep, 0, sizeof(server_ep));
@ -3157,18 +3085,62 @@ void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_alpn_length(void)
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(
&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &options), 0);
/* Offer the same protocol list on both peers so alpn[0] is negotiated and
* serialized into the context. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&client_ep.conf, alpn), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&server_ep.conf, alpn), 0);
switch (field) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
case TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_CID:
/* Configure CID with unique patterns so we can locate the length
* byte in the serialized context. Both peers must agree on the CID
* length via conf_cid() before set_cid() will accept the value. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(
&client_ep.conf, sizeof(client_cid),
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(
&server_ep.conf, sizeof(server_cid),
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(
&client_ep.ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED,
client_cid, sizeof(client_cid)), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(
&server_ep.ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED,
server_cid, sizeof(server_cid)), 0);
sentinel = server_cid;
sentinel_len = sizeof(server_cid);
/* The smallest value strictly greater than sizeof(in_cid), so we
* exercise the bounds check rather than the pre-existing
* buffer-size check that would also trip on huge values. */
corrupt_len = (unsigned char) (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + 1);
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
case TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_ALPN:
/* Offer the same protocol list on both peers so alpn[0] is
* negotiated and serialized into the context. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&client_ep.conf, alpn),
0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&server_ep.conf, alpn),
0);
sentinel = (const unsigned char *) negotiated;
sentinel_len = strlen(negotiated);
/* The length of the longer configured protocol, which is more
* bytes than remain in the buffer. */
corrupt_len = (unsigned char) strlen(alpn[1]);
break;
#endif
default:
TEST_ASSERT(0);
}
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_dtls_join_endpoints(&client_ep, &server_ep), 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_connection(&options, &client_ep,
&server_ep));
TEST_ASSERT(server_ep.ssl.alpn_chosen != NULL);
TEST_EQUAL(strcmp(server_ep.ssl.alpn_chosen, negotiated), 0);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if (field == TEST_SSL_CONTEXT_LOAD_OOB_ALPN) {
TEST_ASSERT(server_ep.ssl.alpn_chosen != NULL);
TEST_EQUAL(strcmp(server_ep.ssl.alpn_chosen, negotiated), 0);
}
#endif
/* Serialize the post-handshake server context. */
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_context_save(&server_ep.ssl, NULL, 0,
@ -3178,20 +3150,18 @@ void ssl_context_load_rejects_oob_alpn_length(void)
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_context_save(&server_ep.ssl, context_buf,
context_buf_len, &context_buf_len), 0);
/* The serialized format writes [alpn_len][alpn bytes]; locate the length
* byte by searching for the negotiated protocol string. */
for (i = 1; i + strlen(negotiated) <= context_buf_len; i++) {
if (context_buf[i - 1] == (unsigned char) strlen(negotiated) &&
memcmp(context_buf + i, negotiated, strlen(negotiated)) == 0) {
alpn_len_p = context_buf + i - 1;
/* Both fields are serialized as [length byte][data bytes]; locate the
* length byte by searching for the sentinel data. */
for (i = 1; i + sentinel_len <= context_buf_len; i++) {
if (context_buf[i - 1] == (unsigned char) sentinel_len &&
memcmp(context_buf + i, sentinel, sentinel_len) == 0) {
len_p = context_buf + i - 1;
break;
}
}
TEST_ASSERT(alpn_len_p != NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(len_p != NULL);
/* Claim the length of the longer configured protocol, which is more bytes
* than remain in the buffer. */
*alpn_len_p = (unsigned char) strlen(alpn[1]);
*len_p = corrupt_len;
/* Reinitialise the server SSL context so we can load into a fresh one. */
mbedtls_ssl_free(&server_ep.ssl);