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Merge 9a455081014f6afdf107d27366bb1ac79a677e72 into 03e1438089654fb884ac48e0f3cd0049cfe2c102

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felipereyesmurcia 2026-10-27 10:46:03 -04:00 committed by GitHub
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3 changed files with 21 additions and 2 deletions
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6
ChangeLog.d/fix-sample-program-memory-errors.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Bugfix
* Fix potential buffer overreads on malformed inputs in sample programs:
ssl_server2 could read past the end of a session ticket shorter than
4 bytes when the dummy_ticket option is enabled, and ssl_context_info
could call strlen() on non-null-terminated ALPN data from the input
file, reading past the end of the decoded buffer. Fixes #10803.

9
programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
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@ -882,8 +882,13 @@ static void print_deserialized_ssl_context(const uint8_t *ssl, size_t len)
printf("\tALPN negotiation : ");
CHECK_SSL_END(alpn_len);
if (alpn_len > 0) {
if (strlen((const char *) ssl) == alpn_len) {
printf("%s\n", ssl);
/* The ALPN protocol name in the serialized data is not
* null-terminated, so do not use strlen() on it: with a
* malformed input file it could read past the end of the
* decoded buffer. Read exactly alpn_len bytes instead, and
* treat an embedded null byte as incorrect data. */
if (memchr(ssl, '\0', alpn_len) == NULL) {
printf("%.*s\n", (int) alpn_len, ssl);
} else {
printf("\n");
printf_err("\tALPN negotiation is incorrect\n");

8
programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
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@ -1385,6 +1385,14 @@ static int dummy_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
int ret;
((void) p_ticket);
/* Tickets are written by dummy_ticket_write() and start with a 4-byte
* lifetime header. Reject shorter tickets (which a misbehaving client
* could send) to avoid an underflow of len - 4 below resulting in a
* read past the end of the ticket buffer. */
if (len < 4) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, buf + 4, len - 4)) != 0) {
return ret;
}