diff --git a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h index 62be3b245d..fa78fe9b1a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h +++ b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -11,11 +11,10 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H -#include "ssl_misc.h" - #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_types.h" const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states in); diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index ecd3e6cc07..c8a7acbbbb 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ #include "mbedtls_common.h" #include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "ssl_types.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -27,180 +30,6 @@ extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[7]; #include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" #include "x509_internal.h" -/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED -#endif - -/** Flag values for mbedtls_ssl_context::flags. */ -typedef enum { - /** Set if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET = 1, -} mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t; - -/** Flags from ::mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t to keep in - * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(). - * - * The flags that are in this list are kept until explicitly updated or - * until mbedtls_ssl_free(). The flags that are not listed here are - * reset to 0 in mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAGS_KEEP_AT_SESSION \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ - -/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) - -/* - * Internal identity of handshake extensions - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 - -/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ -uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); -uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); -/* Macros used to define mask constants */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) -/* Reset value of extension mask */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 - -/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized - * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized - * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing - * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and - * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include - * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. - * - * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 - * - * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish - * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. - * - * RFC 8446 section 4.2 - * - * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is - * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake - * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. - */ - -/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) - -/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) - /* * Helper macros for function call with return check. */ @@ -227,181 +56,6 @@ uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); } \ } while (0) -/* - * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 - * - * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, - * but is distinct for resends. - * - * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 - -/* - * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: - * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - -/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a - * stream cipher can be used. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHERSUITES) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) -/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ -#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ -/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ - ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) - -/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 - -/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for - RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes - (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ) - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 - -/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 - -#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -/* - * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds - */ - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." -#endif - -/* Calculate buffer sizes */ - -/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes - long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the - implicit sequence number. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 -#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for @@ -572,553 +226,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, extern "C" { #endif -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - -/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from - * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those - * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled - * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is - * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. - * - * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, - * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} - * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into - * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. - * - * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH - * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here - * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations - * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the - * computation of the maximum key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 - -/** - * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) - * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { - /*! The key for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The key for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - - size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and - * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ - size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and - * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ -}; -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; - -typedef struct { - unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; - -typedef struct { - unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; - -/* - * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { - /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take - * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ - uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ - uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent - * to the client or not. */ - uint8_t certificate_request_sent; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ - uint8_t early_data_accepted; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. - * - * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used - * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as - * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the - * ServerHello is received. - * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is - * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When - * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously - * negotiated minor version. - * - * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. - * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol - * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS - * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is - * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual - * negotiated value. - */ - mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ - enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ - ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ - } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ - size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ -#endif - - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL - int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL - int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); - MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL - int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; - - /* - * Handshake specific crypto variables - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ - - /** - * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an - * HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by - * the client (<> 0) or not (0). - */ - uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) - /** - * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy - * change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only - * one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state - * transitions for that purpose. - */ - uint8_t ccs_sent; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ -#endif - /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ - uint16_t hrr_selected_group; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) - psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; - size_t xxdh_psa_bits; - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; - uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; - unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; - uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ - size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ - uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; - uint16_t selected_identity; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - struct { - size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated - * buffers used for message buffering. */ - - uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has - * been seen in the current flight. */ - - struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { - unsigned is_valid : 1; - unsigned is_fragmented : 1; - unsigned is_complete : 1; - unsigned char *data; - size_t data_len; - } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; - - struct { - unsigned char *data; - size_t len; - unsigned epoch; - } future_record; - - } buffering; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) - unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS - * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - /* RFC 6347 page 15 - ... - opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; - ... - */ - uint8_t cookie_len; -#else - /* RFC 8446 page 39 - ... - opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; - ... - If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 - */ - uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length - * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ - unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ - - uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ - unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ - unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the - flight being received */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for - resending messages */ - unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter - for resending messages */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ - - uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension - * has been negotiated. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ - unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ - uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of - * \c peer_cid. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Checksum contexts - */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group - * that is being used for ephemeral - * key exchange. - * - * On the client: Defaults to the first - * entry in the client's group list, - * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been - received from server side. If CertificateRequest - has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify - should be sent to server */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - /* - * State-local variables used during the processing - * of a specific handshake state. - */ - union { - /* Outgoing Finished message */ - struct { - uint8_t preparation_done; - - /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to - * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ - unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t digest_len; - } finished_out; - - /* Incoming Finished message */ - struct { - uint8_t preparation_done; - - /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but - * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ - unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t digest_len; - } finished_in; - - } state_local; - - /* End of state-local variables. */ - - unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + - MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; - /*!< random bytes */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; - /*!< premaster secret */ - size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ - uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; - unsigned char *certificate_request_context; -#endif - - /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; - union { - unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - } tls13_master_secrets; - - mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the - * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). - * The library does not use it internally. */ - void *user_async_ctx; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ - size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) - const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -}; - -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; - -/* - * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records - * - * There are the following general types of record transformations: - * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher - * to the authenticated message. - * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every - * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was - * encrypted. - * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one - * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second - * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. - * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained - * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte - * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number - * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation - * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction - * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the - * latter to the encrypted record. - * - * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext - * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true - * content type. - * - * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: - * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. - * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. - * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. - * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. - * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, - * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. - * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static - * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- - * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). - * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. - * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. - * - The length of the authentication tag. - * - * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: - * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in - * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the - * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines - * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if - * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM - * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. - * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but - * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts - * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts - * are unused for AEAD transformations. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly - * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. - * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within - * the transformation context, its contents are stored within - * iv_{enc/dec}. - * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. - * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations - * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the - * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be - * different from the underlying cipher's block length - * in this case. - * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only - * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is - * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in - * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. - * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version - * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. - * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. - * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the - * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused - * in other transformations. - * - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { - /* - * Session specific crypto layer - */ - size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ - size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ - size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ - size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ - size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ - - unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ - unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) - - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ - psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - - mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; - - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ - psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t in_cid_len; - uint8_t out_cid_len; - unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; - unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES) - /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the - * Master Secret and other session info and for the keying material - * exporter in TLS 1.2. - * See ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ - unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + - MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; - /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES) */ -}; - /* * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. @@ -1134,82 +241,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( #endif } -/* - * Internal representation of record frames - * - * Instances come in two flavors: - * (1) Encrypted - * These always have data_offset = 0 - * (2) Unencrypted - * These have data_offset set to the amount of - * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, - * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV - * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used - * (e.g. for stream ciphers). - * - * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case - * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to - * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the - * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to - * make space for the fixed IV. - * - */ -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#endif - -typedef struct { - uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. - * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by - * the 6-byte sequence number. - * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array - * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely - * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do - * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of - * MAC computations. */ - uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ - uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. - * Convert to internal presentation of versions - * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and - * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). - * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ - - unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ - size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ - size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ - size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ - unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -} mbedtls_record; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/* - * List of certificate + private key pairs - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ - mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * List of handshake messages kept around for resending - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { - unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ - size_t len; /*!< length of p */ - unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /** * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS @@ -1280,21 +311,14 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) -/* Declared in "ssl_debug_helpers.h". We can't include this file from - * "ssl_misc.h" because it includes "ssl_misc.h" because it needs some - * type definitions. TODO: split the type definitions and the helper - * functions into different headers. - */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states state); -#endif - static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_states state) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake state: %d (%s) -> %d (%s)", ssl->state, mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state), (int) state, mbedtls_ssl_states_str(state))); +#endif ssl->state = (int) state; } @@ -2118,57 +1142,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t early_data_len); - -typedef enum { -/* - * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early - * data has not started yet. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE, - -/* - * In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication - * extension. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT, - -/* - * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first - * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or - * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data - * is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be - * sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT, - -/* - * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first - * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or - * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data - * has been set and early data can be written now. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, - -/* - * The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted - * it. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, - -/* - * The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected - * it. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, - -/* - * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first - * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the - * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED, - -} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 1f44fc71a7..3e08fc670a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -6617,11 +6617,8 @@ int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max @@ -6643,8 +6640,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); } -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS*/ /* * Handshake functions diff --git a/library/ssl_types.h b/library/ssl_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..843c376ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,1040 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_types.h + * + * \brief Internal types shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TYPES_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TYPES_H + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a + * stream cipher can be used. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHERSUITES) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +/** Flag values for mbedtls_ssl_context::flags. */ +typedef enum { + /** Set if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET = 1, +} mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t; + +/** Flags from ::mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t to keep in + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(). + * + * The flags that are in this list are kept until explicitly updated or + * until mbedtls_ssl_free(). The flags that are not listed here are + * reset to 0 in mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAGS_KEEP_AT_SESSION \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) + +/* + * Internal identity of handshake extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 + +/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); +/* Macros used to define mask constants */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) +/* Reset value of extension mask */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 + +/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized + * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized + * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing + * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and + * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include + * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 + * + * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish + * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + +/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +typedef enum { +/* + * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early + * data has not started yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE, + +/* + * In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication + * extension. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be + * sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * has been set and early data can be written now. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the + * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED, + +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { + /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take + * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent + * to the client or not. */ + uint8_t certificate_request_sent; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ + uint8_t early_data_accepted; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. + * + * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used + * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as + * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the + * ServerHello is received. + * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is + * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When + * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously + * negotiated minor version. + * + * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. + * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol + * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS + * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is + * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual + * negotiated value. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ + + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an + * HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by + * the client (<> 0) or not (0). + */ + uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy + * change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only + * one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state + * transitions for that purpose. + */ + uint8_t ccs_sent; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ +#endif + /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ + uint16_t hrr_selected_group; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; + size_t xxdh_psa_bits; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; + uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; + unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; + uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ + uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; + uint16_t selected_identity; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + struct { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS + * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 6347 page 15 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + ... + */ + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + /* RFC 8446 page 39 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; + ... + If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 + */ + uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length + * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group + * that is being used for ephemeral + * key exchange. + * + * On the client: Defaults to the first + * entry in the client's group list, + * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been + received from server side. If CertificateRequest + has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify + should be sent to server */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* + * State-local variables used during the processing + * of a specific handshake state. + */ + union { + /* Outgoing Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to + * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_out; + + /* Incoming Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but + * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_in; + + } state_local; + + /* End of state-local variables. */ + + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< random bytes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ + uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context; +#endif + + /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; + union { + unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + } tls13_master_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ + size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every + * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was + * encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly + * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; + + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info and for the keying material + * exporter in TLS 1.2. + * See ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES) */ +}; + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#endif /* ssl_types.h */