Add APIs to retrieve the number of certificates embedded in a
PKCS#7 SignedData structure and to extract the embedded certificates
into an mbedtls_x509_crt chain owned by the caller.
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Extend PKCS#7 SignedData verification to support building and
verifying the certificate chain of the signer.
Add extended signature verification APIs that use caller-supplied
trusted certificates and optionally embedded leaf certificates
from the PKCS#7 structure. When embedded leaf certificates are used,
their certificate chain is validated against the provided trusted CAs.
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
The PKCS7 parser is extended to parse multiple certificates from
the certificate set, instead of assuming a single signer certificate.
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Add a check on mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify() so that the verification
fails if the MD alg specified in PKCS7 structure or the signature
algorithm specified in the X.509 certificate are not in the list of
secure algorithms (i.e. mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default).
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <vsetti@baylibre.com>
Replace mbedtls_pk_verify with mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable, as mbedtls_pk_verify has now been
removed and was origonally a pass through call to mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable.
Signed-off-by: Ben Taylor <ben.taylor@linaro.org>
Some code that parses or writes X.509 needs to know OID values. We provide a
convenient list. Don't remove this list from the public interface of the
library.
For user convenience, expose these values in the same header as before and
with the same name as before: `MBEDTLS_OID_xxx` in `<mbedtls/oid.h>`.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit removes #include "mbedtls/buildinfo.h" from pkcs7.c as it is
not needed unlike other C modules.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ramsey <harry.ramsey@arm.com>
Since only a single hash algorithm is currenlty supported, this avoids
having to perform hashing more than once.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
A CMS signature can have internal data, but mbedTLS does not support
verifying such signatures. Reject them during parsing.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Since only one content type (signed data) is supported, storing the
content type just wastes memory.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
The contentInfo field of PKCS7 Signed Data structures can
optionally contain the content of the signature. Per RFC 2315
it can also contain any of the PKCS7 data types. Add test and
comments making it clear that the current implementation
only supports the DATA content type and the data must be empty.
Return codes should be clear whether content was invalid or
unsupported.
Identification and fix provided by:
- Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
- Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
There were some areas where `end_signer` were being
used when it makes more sense to use `end_issuer_and_sn`,
as pointed out by demiobenour@gmail.com.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
Several PKCS7 invalid ASN1 Tests were failing due to extra
data bytes or incorrect content lengths going unnoticed. Make
the parser aware of possible malformed ASN1 data.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
This may have been a use-after-free, but I haven't worked out whether it was
a problem or not. Even if it turns out to have been ok, keeping invalid
pointers around is fragile.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Remove an unnecessary debug print (whoops).
Use new error code for when the x509 is expired.
When there are no signers return invalid certificate.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
Co-authored-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
