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Any timing variance dependant on the output of this function enables a Bleichenbacher attack. It is extremely difficult to use safely. In the Marvin attack paper (https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/marvin-attack-paper.pdf) the author suggests that implementations of PKCS 1.5 decryption that don't include a countermeasure should be considered inherently dangerous. They suggest that all libraries implement the same countermeasure, as implementing different countermeasures across libraries enables the Bleichenbacher attack as well. This is extremely fragile and therefore we don't implement it. The use of PKCS 1.5 in Mbed TLS implements the countermeasures recommended in the TLS standard (7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246) and is not vulnerable. Add a warning to PKCS 1.5 decryption to warn users about this. Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com> |
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| .. | ||
| build_info.h | ||
| crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h | ||
| crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h | ||
| crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h | ||
| crypto_builtin_composites.h | ||
| crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h | ||
| crypto_builtin_primitives.h | ||
| crypto_compat.h | ||
| crypto_config.h | ||
| crypto_driver_common.h | ||
| crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h | ||
| crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h | ||
| crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h | ||
| crypto_extra.h | ||
| crypto_legacy.h | ||
| crypto_platform.h | ||
| crypto_se_driver.h | ||
| crypto_sizes.h | ||
| crypto_struct.h | ||
| crypto_types.h | ||
| crypto_values.h | ||
| crypto.h | ||