mbedtls/ChangeLog.d/tls12-handshake-length-read-bounds.txt
Naveed 77343dc0e5 rework handshake length checks per review
ClientHello: narrow the session-id check to the session id itself, check
the cookie length byte before reading it, and let the ciphersuite-list
length check cover both transports.

CertificateRequest: make the signature-algorithms check also reserve the
two certificate-authorities length bytes instead of adding a separate
check, use the available < needed pattern throughout, and reject an
odd-length signature-algorithms list.

Add injected truncated-ClientHello test cases (TLS 1.2-only builds).

Signed-off-by: Naveed <naveed@bugqore.com>
2026-08-07 15:48:03 +05:30

11 lines
572 B
Plaintext

Bugfix
* Fix a buffer over-read when parsing a TLS 1.2 ClientHello or
CertificateRequest that is truncated inside the two-byte length field
of the ciphersuite list (server side) or of the certificate
authorities list (client side): the length checks preceding those
fields reserved too few bytes, so the length field could be read past
the end of the message. Such messages are now rejected before the
read.
* The TLS 1.2 client now rejects a CertificateRequest message whose
supported_signature_algorithms list has an odd length.