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e462a2ea4e
The TLS 1.3 server accepted a malformed key_share extension in the ClientHello and then closed the connection without sending an alert: - a zero-length key_exchange was accepted; - a key_exchange whose length did not match its group was only caught later, by the key agreement, which returned without pending an alert; - data trailing the client_shares list was ignored. Reject these in ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() and in the shared key-exchange reader mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(): - a zero-length key_exchange and trailing data after client_shares are rejected with a decode_error alert; - a key_exchange whose length does not match the group is rejected with an illegal_parameter alert, which is what OpenSSL does. The shared reader is also used by the client, so it now checks that a ServerHello key_share is consumed exactly. Expose ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() with MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE and add unit tests that feed crafted key_share extensions to the server parser. Fixes #10887. Fixes #10737. Signed-off-by: Joachim Bauernberger <joachim.bauernberger@protonmail.com> |
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| .. | ||
| 00README.md | ||
| cert-write-der-windows.txt | ||
| cmake-config.txt | ||
| fix-ENABLE_PROGRAMS-bug.txt | ||
| numeric-oid-overflow.txt | ||
| serialized-data-load-hardening.txt | ||
| ssl-context-load-alpn-bounds.txt | ||
| tls12-handshake-length-read-bounds.txt | ||
| tls13-key-share-validation.txt | ||
| x509-basic-constraints-integer-first.txt | ||
| x509-empty-authority-key-id.txt | ||