The intent on these lines was to get 'psa_key_type_t' for which
'mbedtls_pk_get_key_type' should clearly be used, not
'mbedtls_pk_get_type'.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX is defined in 'ecp.h' which is a tf-psa-crypto private
header. Instead of relying on that value define a new function named
'mbedtls_ssl_get_supported_tls_id_count' which returns the number of
entries in 'tls_id_match_table'.
Rationale: it does not have too much sense to allocate an array for TLS
IDs which is larger than the list of supported TLS IDs in the current
build.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
Align to recent changes in TLS group ID related functions:
- 'mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id' renamed to
'mbedtls_ssl_is_tls_id_supported'.
- 'mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id' renamed to
'mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id'.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
Its main functionality was to get a TLS ID from 'mbedtls_ecp_group_id' and
then call 'mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id'. The same can be achieved
with public PK functions and 'mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_curve_info',
then calling into 'mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id' as before.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
Instead of retrieving the TLS ID using 'mbedtls_ecp_group_id', which
creates a dependency on the (now tf-psa-crypto private) 'ecp.h' header,
use PSA info to get the same result. Therefore rename the function as
'mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_curve_info'.
This new function has basically the opposite behavior than
'mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id'.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
All the usages of 'mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id' basically
reduce to checking if a specific TLS ID is supported or not. Therefore
the function is replaced with 'mbedtls_ssl_is_tls_id_supported'.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), Section 5.1, states:
Handshake messages MAY be coalesced into a single TLSPlaintext record
or fragmented across several records, provided that:
...
-Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Implementations
MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change
align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the
connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. Because the
ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate
messages can immediately precede a key change, implementations
MUST send these messages in alignment with a record boundary.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
